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Chapter 2
Attitudes: Tendencies and Variations
Abstract: This chapter presents an overview of religiosity and attitudes to reli-
gious diversity in media and other public spaces based on a cross-Scandinavian
survey conducted in 2015. Although Scandinavians in general have a weak per-
sonal connection to religion, Christianity still holds a privileged position as an
expression of cultural identity. Scandinavians express support for equal rights
to practice religion, but also doubtfulness towards public expressions of religion.
More than one-fourth of respondents discuss news about religion and religious
extremism regularly. There is a widespread sentiment that Islam is a threat to the
national culture, even though most respondents state that they oppose an open
expression of hostile attitudes towards foreigners. Political orientation and gen-
der are salient aspects that shape diverging opinions regarding tolerance or
scepticism towards the public visibility of religious diversity. Furthermore,
Danes and Norwegians are more critical of public expressions of Islam than
Swedes.
Keywords: survey, religiosity, political orientation, gender, Islam, religious ex-
tremism
2.1 Introduction
Social and political transformations in each society, and on a global scale, are
challenging the formerly largely homogeneous culture and self-understanding
of the Scandinavian countries. These changes shape attitudes to increasing reli-
gious diversity in the populations and the higher visibility of religion, in partic-
ular, of Islam, in the public debates that are discussed in Chapter 1. Since
changes in values were first measured in the 1980s the World Values Survey In-
stitute¹ has described Scandinavia as the place in which late-modern secular–ra-
tional and self-expression values are ranked highest in the world. Given this
 World Values Survey, Institute for Futures Studies, accessed 23 Aug 2017, http://www.iffs.se/
en/world-values-survey/
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background, how are Scandinavians responding to the new diversity of religious
expression in public spaces, and to the role of the media in this situation?
In order to provide a context for the following case studies of controversies
over religion in various media settings, this chapter presents an overview of re-
ligiosity and attitudes to expressions of religious diversity in the media and in
other public spaces. This overview is based on a cross-national, comparative sur-
vey. The first part of the chapter will present the common tendencies in the sur-
vey. In the second part, the differences between and within the populations in
Scandinavian countries will be discussed with regard to how social factors,
such as age, gender, religiosity, and political opinion, influence views on reli-
gion. Finally, we will briefly discuss how the survey findings compare to the find-
ings on religiosity and with attitudes to cultural diversity found in the European
Social Survey (ESS).
2.2 A Cross-National Comparative Survey
A survey with population representative samples in Denmark, Norway, and Swe-
den was undertaken by the project behind this book (see the Preface) in April
2015.² There were about 1,000 respondents aged 16 years and above in each
country³. The media coverage at that time was focused on the dangers experi-
enced by refugees crossing the Mediterranean, and on the terror attacks in
Paris and Copenhagen in January and February of the same year. The survey
was thus conducted a few months before the peak number of refugees arrived
in the Scandinavian countries in the autumn of 2015.
Data were collected through web panels. Such surveys cover the adult pop-
ulation with access to the Internet which, in Scandinavia, is almost everyone (see
Chapter 1, section 1.8). The survey is thus sampled to be representative at the
country level, but it does not permit meaningful statistical inferences about mi-
nority groups in the population.⁴ All of the data have been weighted by gender,
age, and geographical region.⁵
 The questions were formulated by CoMRel researchers in cooperation with TNS Gallup in Nor-
way (now Kantar TNS) and were translated into Danish and Swedish. The responses were collect-
ed by TNS Gallup in Norway and Denmark, and by TNS Sifo in Sweden, in the period 16–21 April
2015 (Lundby and Jortveit 2015).
 1099 from Norway, 1006 from Denmark and 999 from Sweden. See table 2.2.
 This is due to the low number of minority respondents, including ethnic minorities (i.e. re-
spondents that answered that they or their parents were born outside Scandinavia) and small
minority religious groups.
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2.3 Scandinavian Religiosity: Believing and
Belonging
Our study confirms the World Values Survey findings that Scandinavians, in gen-
eral, have a weak personal connection to religion. As Figure 2.1 shows, fewer
than 10 percent of the respondents have a strong religious self-identification.⁶
The survey also shows that less than 10 percent report that they visit a religious
building to attend a service or prayer meeting each month or more frequently. At
least one-third of the respondents in each country do not identify themselves as
religious. Religious identification is weaker among Swedes and stronger among
the Norwegians and Danes.
Despite the low levels of religious self-identification, a majority of the re-
spondents in the survey state that they primarily feel affiliated to Christianity
as part of their culture or national identity. As pointed out in Chapter 1, the re-
ligious landscape of Scandinavian societies has historically been dominated by
 It was not weighted by education, which may imply some over-representation of higher edu-
cation.
 A variable showing the degrees of religious self-identification among the respondents was
constructed based on the two following items in the survey: ‘To what extent do you regard your-
self as religious,’ and ‘To what extent do you regard yourself to be a believer.’ Those who iden-
tified themselves with these terms fully or to some extent are considered to have a ‘strong or
moderate’ religious self-identification. Those who did not, or to a small extent, regard them-
selves as ‘religious’ or ‘believers’ have a ‘weaker or no’ religious self-identification (see further
Lundby et al. 2017)
Figure 2.1 Religious self-identification in Scandinavia. Percentages. From CoMRel survey, April
2015.
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Lutheran majority churches with strong connections to the state. The majority of
the populations are still members of these churches. As suggested by Grace
Davie, the normal stance in terms of religion in the Nordic countries can be char-
acterized as ‘to belong without believing’ (Davie 2005, 135). Religion, in the form
of Christianity, thus seems to retain significance as a form of cultural belonging
for Scandinavians, even though a minority of them identify as ‘believers’.
2.4 Political Orientation
The Scandinavian societies have historically been characterized by a relatively
stable party structure that is organized primarily around an economic left–
right dimension. In recent decades the growth of new political parties, such as
environmentalist and right-wing populist parties, have challenged the traditional
structure and introduced new political cleavages in which cultural values repre-
sent a key dimension (Lövheim et al. 2018; Flanagan and Lee 2003).
In the survey, political orientation is analysed by combining data on the re-
spondents’ political party preferences with information from the Chapel Hill Ex-
pert Survey on party positions, in terms of views on democratic freedoms and
rights (Bakker et al. 2015). Based on this information, we have placed the survey
answers in one of three categories: ‘libertarian/post-materialist’, ‘centre’, and
‘traditional/authoritarian’.⁷ The distribution of political orientation in the three
Scandinavian countries is shown in Figure 2.2.
As the figure shows, in Norway and Sweden nearly 12 percent of the respond-
ents can be categorized as having a traditional/authoritarian political orienta-
tion, on the basis of their political party preferences. In Denmark, political par-
ties with a traditional/authoritarian orientation have greater support among the
respondents, with 19 percent of the surveyed population. The tendency to polar-
 Examples of ‘libertarian/post-materialist’ parties include Enhedslisten and the Liberal Alliance
in Denmark, Venstre in Norway, and Vänsterpartiet and Miljöpartiet de Gröna in Sweden. Exam-
ples of ‘traditional/authoritarian’ parties include the Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, Kristelig Folk-
eparti, and Fremskrittspartiet in Norway, as well as Sverigedemokraterna in Sweden. Parties that
occupy the ‘centre’ include Socialdemokratiet and Venstre in Denmark, Arbeiderpartiet and
Høyre in Norway, and Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna in Sweden. A respondent is classi-
fied as being ‘libertarian/post-materialist’ if his or her preferred party scores between 0 and 3 on
the GAL–TAN scale, ‘centre’ if the party scores between 3.01 and 6.99, and ‘traditional/author-
itarian’ if the party scores between 7 and 10. ‘Other’ includes respondents who said they
would not vote, or who would vote for a party that was not included in the survey.
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ization between libertarian/post-materialist and traditional/authoritarian orien-
tations is also somewhat stronger in Denmark than in the two other countries.
2.5 Attitudes to Religious Diversity
A particular feature of the Scandinavian society and culture is the strong empha-
sis on individual self-expression, combined with equal treatment of all citizens,
administered by a strong welfare state (Trägårdh 2011). As discussed in Chapter 1,
a tendency to link equality with similarity is particularly strong in Scandinavia
(Gullestad 2002, 46). How, then, do the Scandinavians respond to increased het-
erogeneity of religious beliefs and practices in society?
More than 70 percent of respondents in the survey agree that all religions
should be respected, and more than half of Norwegians and Danes, and almost
two-thirds of the Swedes, strongly or partially agree that all religious groups
should be entitled to the same rights in society. On a general level, freedom of
religious expression thus seems to be supported in Scandinavian societies. How-
ever, when asked about tolerance for particular expressions of religion in public
spaces, opinions differ depending on the religion. Around 80 percent of respond-
ents from all Scandinavian countries agree that a cross, church tower, or other
Christian symbol may be visible on buildings in public space. Seventy-five per-
cent also agree that signs showing the location of a mosque should be visible.
But, when asked about minarets being visible in public space, support drop to
about 60 percent of respondents in Sweden and Norway, and 56 percent in Den-
mark.
That the tendency to support publicly visible expressions of religious faith is
conditioned by the particular religion in question is also evident in responses to
Figure 2.2 Political orientation in Scandinavia (GAL–TAN scale). Percentages. From CoMRel
survey, April 2015.
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questions about the display of religious symbols in particular social contexts.
Table 2.1 shows stronger support for pupils in school to express their religious
faith through wearing a cross rather than a hijab in all the Scandinavian coun-
tries. This tendency is also found amongst teachers in high school, hospital staff,
news presenters, and police officers, although the strength of support differs de-
pending on the professional group. While a majority of respondents accept that
teachers should be free to express their religious faith by wearing a cross, less
than half support police officers publicly expressing their faith in this manner.
Table 2.1 Should people in the following groups be allowed to wear a cross or hijab to express
their religious faith? Percentage of respondents answering yes. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Denmark Norway Sweden
Cross Hijab Cross Hijab Cross Hijab
Pupils in school % % % % % %
Teachers in high school % % % % % %
News presenters % % % % % %
Police % % % % % %
Hospital staff % % % % % %
N   
Note: ’Do not know’ and ’Do not want to answer’ excluded from the tabulations.
The survey also asked respondents if they agreed that religious leaders have a
stronger right than others to express their views on cultural, moral, and ethical
issues in public. Seventy percent or more of the respondents disagree with this
statement for Muslim leaders, but also more than 60 percent oppose Christian
leaders doing so.
These findings suggest that Scandinavians, on an abstract, general level,
support a plurality of expression of religion in society, but that they are more
doubtful towards the expressions of Islam than Christianity. This tendency
seems stronger when public manifestations of religion are connected to state au-
thority, such as in the case of police officers or other state officials wearing the
hijab. Furthermore, the majority of respondents do not think religious leaders
should enjoy any privileged position on such matters.
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2.6 Media Coverage of Religion
The Scandinavian media model described in Chapter 1 implies that the media are
regarded by citizens as part of the communication services that offer public
goods, and that therefore they are expected to handle different religions and
world-views in an equal manner. A majority of Scandinavians still use conven-
tional mass media, such as newspapers, radio, and television, on a daily
basis.What, then, are their opinions about the ways in which media should en-
gage with both religion in general, and with controversial aspects of religious is-
sues in particular?
As can be seen from table 2.2 below our survey shows that, on the one hand,
Scandinavians do not think that the media should increase the coverage of reli-
gious topics or of the major religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (see fur-
ther Chapter 5). On the other hand, the majority want the media to be more crit-
ical in their coverage of religion.
Table 2.2 Percentage of the respondents who fully or partially agree with statements on what
the media ought to do in relation to their coverage of religion. From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
The media ought to… Denmark Norway Sweden
… give more attention to religious topics % % %
… give space to conflicts about religion % % %
… be critical of problematic aspects of religion % % %
… cover religion in satirical ways % % %
… invite dialogue when there are tensions over religion % % %
N   
Note: ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Do not want to answer’ included in the tabulations.
Furthermore, the table shows that a large majority in all three countries support
the notion that the media should engage with problematic aspects of religion, for
instance by giving space to coverage of conflicts, and by being critical and satir-
ical about religion, but also by inviting dialogue when tensions over religious is-
sues occur.
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2.7 Religion and Culture in Conflict
The survey findings reveal the contested nature of public expressions of religion,
in particular of Islam, among Scandinavians today. As shown in Figure 2.3, a ma-
jority of the respondents agree with the statement that religion leads to conflict
rather than to peace.
This question referred to religion in general. Against the background of
emerging political tensions over issues of immigration from Muslim countries
and integration policies, a survey question explicitly asked whether Christianity,
Judaism, and Islam are perceived as threats to national culture. The responses
concerning Islam are shown in Figure 2.4.
As the figure shows, there are differences between the Scandinavian coun-
tries. About half of the Danes (52 percent) fully or partially agree that Islam is
Figure 2.3 Looking at the world, religion leads to conflict rather than to peace. Percentages.
From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Figure 2.4 Do you consider Islam a threat to Danish/Norwegian/Swedish culture? Percentages.
From CoMRel survey, April 2015.
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a threat to their culture. Among Norwegians, almost half (47 percent) agreed
with the statement, while 38 percent of Swedish respondents see Islam as a
threat to national culture. The differences regarding the other world religions
is remarkable: only around 11 percent of all Scandinavians agreed that Judaism
is a threat to their culture, and 6 to 8 percent that Christianity represents a threat.
The survey was taken a few months before the escalation of the war in Syria
and the increasing number of refugees going to Scandinavia in the autumn of
2015. These events may subsequently have made the perception of Islam as a
threat even more pronounced. Furthermore, the question did not include any
specification of ‘culture’.We thus do not know how individual respondents inter-
preted the term, or to what extent these attitudes are related to other opinions or
actions. Finally, even though the results show a widespread negative sentiment
towards Islam in all three countries, the population is divided over the issue. A
third of Scandinavians disagree to some extent with the postulation that Islam
poses a threat to national culture.
Following the escalation of media reports on Islamist terror and the general
swing towards populism and nationalism in public discourse, one might expect
a similar pattern of scepticism towards immigrants in general. The survey shows
that between 13 and 18 percent of the respondents agree that hostile attitudes
towards foreigners should be accepted in society.While a majority, then, of Scan-
dinavians seem to oppose xenophobic attitudes, the countries differ also on this
issue. Sixty percent of Danes, 67 percent of the Norwegians, and 73 percent of the
Swedes answered that hostile attitudes to foreigners should not be tolerated. Fig-
ure 2.5 shows the need for a closer look at the relationship between the respons-
es of those individuals who perceived Islam to be a threat to national culture and
those who accept hostile attitudes against foreigners.
Figure 2.5 Agreement with the statement ‘hostile attitudes towards foreigners should be ac-
cepted’ among people considering Islam a threat to national culture. Percentages. From CoMRel
survey, April 2015.
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In all three countries, as Figure 2.5 shows, a majority of those who consider
Islam a threat to national culture do not tolerate hostile attitudes against foreign-
ers, while about a fourth of them tolerate such attitudes. If we look at the whole
population in the Scandinavian countries, those who tolerate hostile attitudes
against foreigners and are sceptical of Islam make up 10– 12 percent of the pop-
ulation. This finding also raises the question of whether some of the respondents
might interpret tolerance of hostile attitudes towards foreigners as part of an ar-
gument supporting freedom of expression, rather than a critique of other ethnic
or religious groups per se. These findings underline the importance of further
analysis of the relationship between attitudes that concern freedom of expres-
sion, freedom of religion, and tolerance of religious diversity. The present
study did, however, not provide data to conduct this kind of analysis.
2.8 Patterns of Similarity and Difference
The general tendencies in the survey’s findings, presented above, strengthen the
image that, against the backdrop of high levels of secular–rational values among
Scandinavian populations, religious diversity in the public sphere in Scandina-
via is a topic on which opinions diverge, and which gives rise to tensions over
cultural identity and common values (as suggested in Chapter 1). The similarities
and differences between Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes in the survey show the
need for a further discussion about how various factors of historical experiences
and social stratification in Scandinavian societies play into the general tenden-
cies. The World Values Survey shows that secular–rational values and self-ex-
pression values are more frequent among the younger generations, while tradi-
tional values and strong religiosity are more common among the older
generations. High levels of self-expression values are also connected to the tol-
erance of foreigners and gender equality. This makes it relevant to ask how the
main tendencies in the attitudes towards religion that are found in the survey
differ with regard to age and religious self-identification, as well as gender.
In this last part of the chapter, we present an analysis of differences between
the countries reported in the previous sections. The purpose of this analysis is to
test and validate whether central findings from the descriptive analysis hold
when we control for the effects of key independent variables, such as age, gen-
der, political opinion, and religiosity.We focus on differences that are related to a
number of issues from the survey’s findings which concern attitudes to expres-
sions of religious diversity in public spaces and to controversial issues regarding
religion, such as religious extremism and intolerance.
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2.9 Critique and Tolerance of Religion
We conducted regression analyses of five dependent variables. The variables in
the regression analysis concern two groups of questions. The first set of ques-
tions are those that have been discussed on a general level in the previous sec-
tions, that is, questions concerning attitudes to Islam as a threat to national cul-
ture, tolerance for hostile attitudes against foreigners, and satire of religion as an
expression of a critique against religion in public settings. For these variables we
conducted multinomial regression analyses. Here, we focus on the general find-
ings from the regression models. For detailed results and information on the
variables included in the analysis, please see table A.2 in the Appendix.
The general finding of a widespread concern about Islam as a threat to na-
tional culture is qualified by our analysis. Of the different social factors included
in the analysis, political orientation is associated with the strongest effect in
terms of differences in attitudes. Individuals with a traditional/authoritarian ori-
entation seem more inclined to agree with the statement, particularly if com-
pared to those with a libertarian/post-materialist orientation, but also, to a cer-
tain extent, if compared to individuals holding a centrist position. Besides
political orientation, there are statistically significant effects of gender and
age. Men are more inclined to agree with the statement that Islam represents
a threat than are women, and the older generations are also more inclined to
agree than the younger ones. Finally, Danes and Norwegians are significantly
more inclined than Swedes to regard Islam as a threat. The effect of religious
self-identification is not statistically significant.
This pattern is, to a large extent, replicated with regard to responses to the
statement about whether xenophobic attitudes should be tolerated. Individuals
with a traditional/authoritarian political orientation are more likely to agree that
such attitudes should be tolerated, while those identified as libertarian/post-ma-
terialist are more likely to disagree. The effect of gender is also statistically sig-
nificant, with men being more likely to agree with the statement than are
women. Again, Swedes are significantly more likely to disagree with the state-
ment about tolerating xenophobic attitudes than are the Danes and Norwegians.
Stronger religious self-identification and higher age are also associated with a
higher likelihood of agreeing with the statement. However, these effects are
far weaker than the effects of political orientation and gender.
The same patterns that show up in attitudes to Islam and to xenophobic
statements also seem to be relevant to questions concerning tolerance of satire
of religion in public discussions. The effects of gender and political orientation
are particularly strong, with men, and individuals with a traditional/authoritar-
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ian political orientation, more inclined to agree that such expressions should be
allowed in society. The effects of age, religious self-identification, and country
are also statistically significant, but the associations are not as strong as are
those of gender and political orientation.
2.10 Discussing News on Religion and Religious
Extremism in the Media
As the core of this study concerns contestations of public expressions of religion
in the media, the second set of questions referred to discussions of news about
religious extremism in the media. The survey included a question about the fre-
quency of discussing news coverage of religion and religious extremism. More
than one-fourth of the respondents answered that they discuss news on religious
extremism daily or weekly. The survey also shows that such discussions primar-
ily take place in settings like the home, and with friends. These findings will be
further discussed in Chapter 3. For the analysis in this chapter, we focus on how
factors such as age, gender, political orientation, and religiosity affect the prob-
ability of discussion of religious extremism. For these variables, we conducted
binomial logistic regression analyses. See Table A.3 in the Appendix for detailed
results.
The previous sections show that concerns about increased religious diversity
and how such concerns should be expressed in public discussions differ, in par-
ticular between respondents of different political orientation and gender, but
also with a person’s age, religiosity and country. Are there similar differences
among the quarter of the respondents that discuss news on religious extremism
daily or weekly?
The results show, firstly, that respondents with a high or moderate level of
religious identification seem more inclined to discuss news about religious ex-
tremism with others. Turning to political orientation we see that individuals
with traditional/authoritarian and liberal/post-materialist preferences are more
likely to discuss news on religious extremism with others compared to individu-
als voting for centre parties. Gender also has a strong effect with regard to like-
lihood of discussing news on religious extremism with others and on the con-
texts where these discussions take place. Men seem more inclined than
women to discuss news on religious extremism, and to discuss these issues in
the workplace and on social media. Women prefer to discuss such issues in
the family or among friends. Men also report higher participation in public de-
bate on religion, for example by participating in debate in print and online
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media. Men seem in general more critical of expressions of religion in public, es-
pecially Islam, and support critical coverage of Islam and Judaism in the media
more than women do.Women appear to be more supportive of the statement that
all religions should be respected. Finally, age has a strong effect when it comes
Figure 2.6 Influence of selected variables on discussions of news on religious extremism:
Substantive effects. Based on the CoMRel survey, April 2015.
Notes: Baseline in the two graphs (a and b) refers to the predicted probability of participating in
(a) a discussion of news on religious extremism and (b) an online debate on religious extremism
when all independent variables are held at their mean values. The remaining pillars in each
graph show how the probability of participating varies when we alter the value on each variable
from 0 to 1 while holding the remaining independent variables constant at their mean values.
Attitudes: Tendencies and Variations 45
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 3/19/19 3:34 PM
to discussions of news on religious extremism online. Individuals younger than
45 are more inclined to discuss religion and religious extremism online than
older generations.
2.11 Scandinavian Attitudes in European
Comparison
The survey findings show that although Scandinavians in general have a weak
personal connection to religion, Christianity still holds a privileged position as
an expression of cultural identity. Scandinavians express support for equal
rights to practice religion in general, but are doubtful towards public expressions
of religion that grows when these are connected to public institutions and offi-
cials, and explicitly references Islam. A majority in all three countries equate re-
ligion with conflict and support media engagement in criticism of religion, but
also wish that media would initiate dialogue about tensions over religious is-
sues. More than a quarter of respondents discuss news about religion and reli-
gious extremism regularly. There is a widespread sentiment that Islam is a threat
to national culture, even though most respondents state that they oppose the
open expression of hostile attitudes towards foreigners.
Our analysis of differences related to various social factors indicates that po-
litical orientation and gender are salient factors in shaping diverging opinions
towards toleration or scepticism of the public expression of religious diversity,
and of how such opinions may be expressed in society. There are also differences
across countries, where Danes and Norwegians seem more critical of public ex-
pressions of Islam than Swedes. These differences mirror to some extent histor-
ical and political differences between Scandinavian countries and social groups
as discussed in Chapter 1, such as the prominence of right-wing political parties
criticizing Islam in public debate.
To what extent do the general tendencies and differences emerging in our
survey represent a particular Scandinavian pattern, or are Scandinavians rather
becoming more like other European countries in attitudes to religious diversity?
We compared the patterns emerging in our survey and similar questions asked in
the 2014 European Social Survey (ESS)⁸ in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, with four
other Western European countries – Germany, the Netherlands, France, and the
UK. The comparison confirms that the Scandinavian countries have the relatively
 The questions and variables used in the ESS 2014 study can be found at ESS online analysis
module: http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/ (Accessed 4 Aug, 2017).
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fewest people who consider themselves very religious. Also, gender differences,
especially in attitudes to ethnic and religious diversity, are rather more marked
in Scandinavian countries than in the other countries. In Scandinavia as well as
in the other countries chosen for comparison women score slightly higher than
men on most measures of liberal/post-materialist values.
Individual Scandinavian countries have some outlier results in the ESS rele-
vant to attitudes to mediatized conflicts involving religion. Sweden stands out (in
2014), for welcoming attitudes to Muslim migrants compared to a European aver-
age.⁹ Norwegians rate their contact with people from other ethnic or racial
groups less favourably than the European average.¹⁰ Finally, Danish respondents
give the most negative evaluation of laws against ethnic discrimination in the
workplace, with 12 percent judging these ‘extremely bad for the country’,
which is more than twice as high as anywhere else in Europe.
These differences between the Scandinavian countries belies the idea that
Scandinavia represents a homogeneous cultural entity. Looking at the particular
set of values asked about in the ESS 2014, individual Scandinavian countries are
closer to other European countries than to each other on some items. Sweden is
for example on several issues closer to Germany than to Denmark, which often
comes out closer to the UK. This suggests that a variety of social and political
factors are needed to explain attitudes to religious and cultural diversity. The dif-
ferences between the countries should be related to different experiences of mi-
gration and institutional multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), com-
bined with differences in the media representation of Islam and Muslims;
certainly, recent studies point to a more negative media frame in Denmark
than in Sweden (ECRI 2012; Lundby et al. 2018; see also Chapter 12), which
may in turn reflect different recent histories. For example, experiences of crises
such as the Muhammad cartoon affair have made the Danish debate about im-
migration and Islam somewhat more polarized than in other Scandinavian coun-
tries.
The CoMRel survey indicates that, within the group of respondents frequent-
ly discussing religion and religious extremism in the media, men are more in-
clined to engage in such discussions in public settings while women prefer pri-
vate settings like family and friends. The ESS data support that women in
Scandinavia seem to be more tolerant to religious diversity than men. Previous
research points to the importance of exposure to other religious faiths, through
 The ESS shows 37.6 percent of Swedes agreed with the statement ‘allow many to come and live
here’ compared to a European average of 11 percent.
 In Norway, 48 percent rate their contact at 7– 10 on a scale from 1 ‘extremely bad’ to 10 ‘ex-
tremely good’ compared to a European average of 57 percent.
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personal encounters and in communities, for tolerance of religious diversity
(Smith 2007, 351). The ESS includes questions about frequency and quality of
contact with people of other cultures.¹¹ There is no overall pattern across coun-
tries relating frequency of contact to gender. In quality of contact however, a
clearer pattern emerges. More women rate quality of contact very positively (7
and above on a scale of 1– 10) than men in the seven countries in our compar-
ison (except Germany), though the differences are small.
Further studies are needed to shed more light on the relationship between
people’s attitudes to religious and cultural diversity in society, and their liber-
al/post-materialist or traditional-authoritarian political orientation and gender.
Nevertheless, the general tendencies and differences revealed in our survey set
the stage for how contestations over religion are played out in the media and
how various individuals in the population engage with them. In this way, the
survey findings provide an important contextualization for the case studies in
the coming chapters of this book.
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